•
Muslims
in Western Europe
Jørgen Nielsen
Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, second edition 1995, reprinted 2001
In Chapter
One the author describes the older contacts between Europe and Islam:
1.
Muslim rule in Sicily and Southern Italy until the Normans put and end to it in
the 11th century and Islamic Spain until the reconquista
of 1492 . Rich contribution to
European culture.
2. In
the wake of the Mongol armies in the 13th century communities were established
in Russia north of the Caspian and Black Seas that became Muslim after a few
generations. They are known as Tatars.
3.
Expansion of the Ottoman empire during the 16th and
17th into the Balkans and Central Europe: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania,
Romania and Greece. The second siege of Vienna, 1683, left many stragglers and
prisoners behind in the German speaking countries, the beginning of Muslim
settlers in Austria and Germany.
4.
Expansion of Prussia in 18th century. The Prussian cavalry had units
of Tatars, defectors from Russian armies, and a contingent of Turkish
guardsmen. Establishment of a Muslim cemetery followed by a
Muslim mosque in 1866. Until World War I narrow relations existed
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire.
5. The Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. It gave concessions to its Muslim population with
regard to family law, which became the basis of later legislation in 1979.
6.
The origin of Islam in Britain goes back to the East Indian Company that
recruited seamen in Indian ports from the second half of the 18th
century, many of who were Muslim. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1969
Yemeni and Somali seamen were recruited as well. There were sizable communities
in Liverpool (vanishing after 1908) and London (building of a mosque in Woking
in 1889).
7.
Even before World War I France experienced labour migration notably from
Algeria. During the war the French government adopted a policy of
requisitioning men from their colonies . In
recognition of the war effort of Algerians, Tunesians,
Moroccans and Senegalese a mosque was opened for them in Paris in 1926. It was
in this immigrant community that the early steps were taken towards Algerian
independence.
Chapter
2 is all
about France and Chapter 3 about West Germany.
Chapter
4 discusses
the United Kingdom after World War II.
The
first wave came from the various islands of the West Indies in the late 1940s.
During the 1950s migration from the Indian subcontinent averaged about 10,000 a
year, increasing sharply just before the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962.
Until that time entry into Britain by citizens of British colonies and member
countries of the Commonwealth was unrestricted. The act was a response to a
growing public debate over the desirability of large-scale immigration of
‘coloureds’ fuelled by ‘race riots’ in London and Nottingham.
The
controls were not very effective and immigration continued, mostly from
Pakistan, both West and East (the latter Bangladesh
since 1971). The immigration act of 1962 did move the emphasis in immigration,
now more towards family reunion.
In
1968 a further restriction was introduced by withdrawing the automatic right of
entry from British passport-holders who could not show a family connection with
Britain. The purpose was to control immigration of East African Asians (Kenya,
Uganda), experiencing pressure from Africanisation
policies.
In
1981 estimates put the Muslim population of Britain at 750,000. Ten years later
the number had grown between 1.25 and 1.5 million.
Settlement
in Britain has been geographically uneven. The common phenomenon is that of
settlement in the large cities and town. Almost half of the Muslims in Britain
live in and around London. The West Midlands (notably
Birmingham), Yorkshire and the region around Manchester account for almost two
thirds of the rest.
Britain
has no generally applicable legal framework for religious communities. The law
which regulates charitable organisations provides the form under which Muslim
organisations and mosques operate. Most mosques and organisations have arisen
out of local initiatives and are community mosques set up by a particular
community to serve its own needs. However, the result has often been that
branches were established of Islamic movements with origins in the Indian
subcontinent. The Deobandi and Brelwi
movement are the two traditions which have the widest support. They form loose
networks among one another with no formal organisational structure.
Two
other movements are the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Jamaat-i-Islami. The Ahl-i-Hadith
controls mosques around the country and has its main centre of operation in
Birmingham. Apart from providing the common services expected from Mosques,
mainly Qur’an school facilities for the young, the Ahl-i-Hadith have made themselves particularly noted for their
distribution of literature and audio- and video-cassette propagating a policiy of separation from non-Muslim society. The Jamaat-i-Islami exists as a movement, but not as an
organisation. Its four organisations are held together by overlapping personnel
and cooperation in programmes. The programmes include research, translations
and publications. The UK Islamic Mission, mainly active in Birmingham, is part
of the Jamaat movement. It connects with the wider
society by welcoming professionals to familiarise themselves with Muslim
perspectives and concerns and by inviting officials (government, law, school
and church) to open celebrations of festivals.
A
third type of organisations (apart from the mosques and the movements) is based
on nationality, like the Mecca-based Muslim World League (the Rabita), the Libya-based Call of Islam and the
Muslim Institute identifying with Iran.
A
further dimension is that of national umbrella organisations, or federations of
organisations. The first one was the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO) in
1970, followed in the mid-eighties by the Council of Mosques (perceived Saudi
connections) residing at the office of the Muslim World League in London, and
its rival the Council of Imams and Mosques.
The
Islamic Cultural Centre [http://www.iccuk.org/] and mosque in Regent’s
Park in London is in a category of its own. It has a long history going back
much further than its official establishment in 1944. Apart
from serving its traditional clientele of expatriates (the reason for a board
of trustees consisting of the ambassadors of Muslim countries) its puts itself
at the disposal of all major Muslim groups in the country wanting to reach
beyond themselves.
Sections
within the churches were among the earliest to react to the religious dimension
of the ethnic minority communities. The immediate spur to action was the large
cultural World of Islam Festival (1976). Local and national contacts over the
years facilitated the creation in 1987 of the Interfaith Network for the UK.
This encompasses the main organisations of all the major religious communities
in Britain, including the Muslims. [http://www.interfaith.org.uk/]
Many
of the practical problems faced by Muslims living in Britain have to be sorted
out at the local level, since much of government administration is
decentralised. The establishment of a mosque is a case in point,
the provision of halal meat is another. Local
authorities have the power to lift the law of stunning before slaughter on
religious grounds.
Education
has been a major issue. In 1971, a national report on schools’ reactions to
immigrant pupils listed matters relating to religious education and school
worship [both required by the Education Act of 1944], uniform dress and dress
for physical education and swimming, and diet [the schools solved the problem
by vegetarian alternatives rather than halal
meat]. In 1985 the Lord Swann report came out in reaction to underachieving by
ethnic minority pupils. The report dealt with Muslims in terms of culture and
ethnic groups rather than in terms of religious principles and priorities. The
uncritical acceptance of educationists that one of the purposes of education is
to create an autonomous and critical individual was decried as being a refusal
to accept the absolute of the divine.
After
starting with one of the worst reputations in dealing with ethnic minorities in
Britain, Birmingham entered into a major change of course during the 1970s. In
1983, the newly founded Muslim Liaison Committee presented a set of concerns
regarding how schools ought to deal with their Muslim pupils. These concerns
included facilities for prayer, proper Muslim dress and diet, and respect for
Muslim perspectives in the school curriculum, particularly in Religious
Education, drama, music and sex education. The reaction of the city council was
to set up a joint working party of experts rather politicians. It was
remarkable that the discussions did not include the demand of a Muslim
voluntary aided school (according to the Education Act of 1944). Many among the
Muslim leadership were concerned to try to obtain as much cooperation as
possible from the city within the school system [meant for the many not for the
few]. Another factor was that Birmingham had retained about six secondary
girls’ schools, mainly in response to the demand of Muslim and other
minorities, so that that particular pressure was less than elsewhere [Bradford,
London Borough of Brent].
The
Education Reform Act of 1988 prescribes a mainly or broadly Christian content
in both Religious Education (RE) and school worship with some space admitted
for other world faiths. It is possible to apply for an exemption to a local
Standing Advisory Committee on RE. The Act further strengthens the role of
parents and the local community in running schools allowing a kind of control
which previously could only have been achieved by obtaining voluntary aided
status.
Chapter
5 is about
the Netherlands and Belgium, Chapter 6 about Scandinavia and Chapter
7 about Southern Europe.
Chapter
8 discusses
“Family, law and culture”
Family
Life
The
first phase of immigration was characterised by single men lodging together in
houses owned by earlier immigrants, often from the same village or region. As
wives and children joined, it became necessary to find more private
accommodation. The system of waiting lists for rented property worked against
recent immigrants. As Muslims they were reluctant to enter into loan
arrangements in the British mortgage market. The solution, where possible, was
to mobilise the resources of the extended family. By the early 1980s three
quarters of Pakistani families lived in property which they owned, mostly
terraced housing. The Bangladeshis who arrived later
when house-allocation policies had become more flexible, are more likely to
live in rented public housing, mainly apartment blocks.
Family
reunion had more consequences than housing. It entailed involvement in matters
relating to health and schooling as well, always getting having to deal with
public officialdom and bureaucracy.
Many
of these new experiences were not uniquely linked to the move from country of
origin to Europe. They would have been experienced in similar ways, had the
move been from the Punjab to Karachi rather than to Birmingham.
Specific
European difficulties did arise from differences of language and culture.
European officials, care staff and educational professionals did not understand
traditional gender relations or authority structures in the parts of the Muslim
world from which the immigrants came, e.g. expecting women to speak for
themselves without referring constantly to male relatives or misjudging the
relationships between parents and children.
The
element of cultural particularities, not just national origins but regional
variations as well, cannot be ignored in a discussion of immigrant family life.
One can mention the contrasts between Punjabi and Pathan
in Pakistan, or those between Berber and Arab in Algeria, or those between
Kurdish and Turkish citizens of Turkey. This apart from the
level of education and the peasant or trading backgrounds of the immigrants.
Family
Law
The
Muslim perceptions of what is legitimate or illegitimate in family relations
among Muslims in Europe depend on what particular combination occurs of (1) Shari’a , the principles and rules on family life based on
the Qur’an), (2) local custom in the place of origin,
often at variance with Shari’a, e.g. arranged
marriages and adoption practices, (3) modern legislation in the country of
origin, often promulgated after World War II when independence was acquired,
e.g. with regard to divorce and inheritance, and (4) local administrative
practices in the place of origin, in particular with regard to registration of
marriages and the children born out of marriage.
The
immigrants from Muslim countries with their complex law systems have
furthermore to reckon with the legislation in Western Europe. For the sake of
marriage stability it has become an accepted principle of international law,
that one’s family law of origin moves with one across boundaries. In this way,
courts in a given country find that they have to apply foreign law within their
own jurisdictions. However, the choice of foreign law is made by different
criteria in mainland Europe and in Britain. In the former, it is the
nationality of the parties concerned which determines the choice of law, while
in Britain it is the domicile, one’s ‘permanent home’.
But
there comes a point when European courts will refuse to implement the foreign
law fully. This is when it runs up against what are conceived of as basic
principles of morality and public order. E.g. most European countries find it
difficult to recognise a traditional unrestrained Islamic talaq,
the declaration by a man divorcing his wife, without going through a judicial
procedure, as is still the law in Morocco. European countries also find it
difficult to recognise the marriage of minors, which was made legal again in Iran
after the Islamic revolution.
The
legal personal status of a person (married or non-married, child of so and so)
determines access to social welfare payments, status in taxation, entry into the country for settlement or visits, etc. In
each instance, an applicant will have to show to bureaucrats of a foreign
country that a marriage exists or has ceased to exist, or that children belong
to parents as claimed.
The
particular areas of family law which cause problems tend to be in recognition
of polygamous marriages, the status of enforced marriages, divorce and the
custody of children.
Cultural
changes
The
Muslim communities of Indian subcontinental origin in
Britain have consistently shown a lower level of household income than those of
Sikh and Hindu families. This is evidently attributable to a great reluctance
to allow adult women into the wider job market, a reluctance which is
explicable in terms of strict Islamic purdah,
the seclusion of women from public observation (the usual garment is the burqa, which may or may not include the yasmak, a veil to conceal the face). This
custom does not apply to Turkish women who have consequently a much higher
level of employment.
As
children of immigrants grow up, parents find that their own experiences in
growing up have become irrelevant. As they try to guide their children in
matters of behaviour, choice of companions and careers and, most significantly,
marriage, parents often find themselves being authoritarian because they can no
longer be authoritative.
The
practice of Punjabi parents arranging marriages for their children is adapting
to new circumstances. More and more, the children are taking the initiative to
make the first introduction, the parents are brought in through a process of
negotiation, and the final arrangement is thus the product of a family
consensus.
From
the quarters of Salafi, puritan and Shari’a-based (such as sympathisers with the Wahhabis, Muslim Brethren and the followers of Mawdudi, founder of the Jama’at_i_Islami)
there is a distinct and clear criticism of the various forms of accommodation.
This applies to traditional local custom at variance with the Shari’a as to adaptations to the areligious
European states. On the whole Islam has a history of integrating successfully
into new cultures.
Chapter
9 deals with
Muslim organisations and movements
The
degree of organisation may differ considerably. Some of the traditional Sufi
orders are so loose that they hardly can be considered orders in any meaningful
sense. Others are tightly structured and controlled with a hierarchical
leadership.
Many
Muslim organisations which have formed the roots of those we see about us in
Europe today, are the product not only of processes within Islam, but also -
and very significantly of the organised Muslim reaction to the expansion of
European influence during the last several centuries. This is most clearly the
case in the Indian subcontinent.
Once
these organisations came to Europe and wanted official recognition (fr instance for funding purposes) they had to meet the
criteria for association laid down by the law in the European countries,
meaning the adoption of committee structures, the concept of membership and
officers, annual general meetings, voting etc.
A. South Asia
The
context of Islamic movements originating in the Indian subcontinent has been
the decline of the Moghul empire
during the 18th century and its subsequent replacemtn
by British imperial rule in 1858.
1. An early response to Moghul decline had
been concentrated among the ‘ulama’ [the community of
learned men], in particular those of Delhi and Lucknow.
The figure of Shah Waliyulla (1703-62) epitomises
this first period, but various Sufi orders and the leadership of ‘pirs’ [holy men] with shrine-based popular cult also played
a leading part in preserving Islamic expression.
2. The Deobandi movement, called after Deoband, a town some one hundred miles north of Delhi. In
1868, a group of Muslim scholars founded a college, ‘dar
al’ulum’, in the town. The college became famous for
the study of Hadith [traditions relating to the
sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad]. From the beginning Urdu was the
language of instruction and Deoband became
instrumental in spreading Urdu as the common language of Muslim learning throughout
the subcontinent. The school established a wide reputation as source of
authoritative legal opinions, ‘fatawa’, in the Hanafi school of law [one of four
“schools of law” and considered the oldest and most liberal]. It had
also strong roots in certain Sufi orders with emphasis on individual spiritual
discipline and individual instruction from a respected ‘shaykh’
[spiritual master who has adopted the sunna
(life_style, way of life) of the prophet Muhammad].
3. The Ahl-i-Hadith rejected not only the
traditional teachings and chains of authority of the Sufi orders but also the
authority of the classical schools of law. They insisted on the Hadith (and not saintly models) as the source for Qur’anic interpretation.
4. The Brelwi [teacher guide] movement,
founded by Ahmad Riza Khan (1856-1921) opposed the Deobandi and the Ahl-i-Hadith. It
emphasised the centrality of the prophet Muhammad and the descendants of the
prophet, the ‘sayyids’. The birth of the prophet is
the largest popular festival, the ‘mawlud’. They also
kept festivals associated with individual ‘pirs’ at
some local or regional centre of pilgrimage.
5. The Tablighi-jama’at movement, in its
Arabic form as Jam’at al-Tabligh,
could be described as the active pietism of the Deobandi
movement. It was founded by Muhammad Ilyas
(1885-1944) and places much emphasis on active (itinerant) preaching. The
movement spread to many Muslim countries in the world.
In Britain it is organised in close conjunction with the Deobandi
network.
6. The Jama’at-i-Islami is closely
associated with its founded Abu al-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979) who took a thoroughly anti-secular
line, insisting that Muslims should be aiming for an Islamic state governed by
Islamic ideology founded on the Qur’an and Sunna. In 1941 he founded the Jamaát-i-Islami
as a political party to have a stronger voice in the process moving towards
independence. In 1947 he migrated with thousands of other Indian Muslims to the
new state of Pakistan. Many of his books and pamphlets became bestsellers
throughout the Middle East and the Muslim world.
B. The Arab world - East
(Saudi Arabia and Egypt)
7. The Wahhabis movement was founded in
Arabia by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd
al-Wahhab (1703-91). He rejected the traditional
consensus (‘ijma’) of the scholars and called for
Islamic teaching to be based solely on the Qur’an and
Sunna, as recorded in the Hadith.
A strong element of his teaching was the obligation to ‘impose the good and
indict the evil’. This amounted to a call for the return of Islam in a Bedouin
society which appears to have left Islam in all but name.
After the collapse of the
Ottoman empire the Wahhabis
took over Mecca and Medina in 1924. In 1932 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud
was proclaimed king of Saudi Arabia. Oil was discovered in 1933. Since then the
problem has been to cope with western influence and changed circumstances ànd to maintain the purity of 18th century Wahhabi.
The Saudi government sponsors
a number of Mosques and imams in Europe and finances the Muslim World League.
8. The Salafiyya movement represents a
conscious reaction to European encroachments. Seminal figures are Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani (1839-97), political activist, Muhammad ‘Abduh
(1849-1905), scholar and reformer of the Azhar
university in Cairo,
and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), author of
a major Qur’an commentary began by Muhammad ‘Abduh. Central to Rida’s ideas
were a return to the ideals and practices of the first generation of Muslims,
the ‘salaf’, whence the term ‘Salafiyya’
by which Rida and his followers are often known. Rida played a leading role in the establishment of the
Muslim World Congress in 1927, which is presently active in interfaith
projects, like the World Conference on Religions and Peace.
9. The Muslim Brotherhood has also been considered an outcome of the
work of Rashid Rida. It was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906-49). The
Brotherhood represented a desire to develop individual and social self-reliance
among Muslims in the face of westernisation. Hasan
al-Banna was a man of action, only with the appearance
of Syed Qutb (1906-66)
acquired the Brotherhood an ideological foundation. Qutb was committed to the reinstatement of
Islam at the centre of political and social life. Anything introduced into
Muslim life which did not have sanction in the life of the community during the
life of Muhammad represented ‘jahiliyyah’or
pre-Islamic ignorance. The only way forward was to withdraw from such a
society, to perform a new ‘hijrah’ [
migration, referring to Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Madinah (622 ). The word hijrah
means to leave a place to seek sanctuary or freedom from persecution or freedom
of religion or any other purpose. Hijrah can also
mean to leave a bad way of life for a good or more righteous way], and to enter
into a struglle, a ‘jihad’, against it. The process
of identifying the ‘jahiliyyah’ society, of
identifying its disbelief, is ‘takfir’.
The post-Qutb
Brotherhood was the prime mover and planner in the Islamic uprising in Syria
during the early 1980s, and the ideas of Qutb have
been absorbed into the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement, Hamas. In Europe the Brotherhood ideology has been the main
factor in the creation of students’Islamic societies.
C. The Arab world - West (Maghreb = Libya, Tunesia, Algeria
and Morocco; Turkey)
In Maghreb
the story is not one of identifiable movements. Rather we are dealing with the
relationships btween Muslims and the colonial power
and with independence movements.
Turkey
The Ottoman empire
collapsed in defeat during the World War I preserving only, thanks to General
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the
territory which became modern Turkey in 1920. His new government represented a
full commitment to the incorporation of Turkey within the European cultural and
political sphere. This was not to deny the Islamic tradition of Turkey, but
this tradition had to be privatised. The laicism of Kemalist
Turkey, deeply infused with anti-clericalism, owed much to the intellectual
heritage of France. From the late 1930s, and gathering pace through the 1950s,
it was realised in the Kemalist establishment that
some form of accomodation with Islam had to be
reached, and there was a retreat from the extreme laicism of the Atatürk reforms. The government recognised so-called Imam-Khatib colleges which produced officials for local mosques.
A Department for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was
created in the Prime Minister’s office. In later years, in response to the
threat of leftist movements, the government took up careful contacts with
Islamic movements and groups:
10. The Süleymancis were a reaction to the
relegation of Islam to the private sphere. The founder of the movement was Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959), the son of a shaykh
[spiritual master] of the Naqshabandi Sufi
order. He founded Qur’an
schools in the villages and towns of Anatolia in rival of the state schools.
After World War II his son-in-law Kemal Kacar expanded the Qur’an schools
which were presented as the bearers of a pure, uncompromising Islam. During the
the mid-1960s the Süleymanci
movement started cooperating with Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party. The Süleymancis
were the first major Turkish Islamic movement to establish itself among Turkish
émigrés in Europe centred in Cologne. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey
they found themselves retreating because of concerted Diyanet
policy.
11. The Nurcu. The Jama’at al-Nur [Association of
Light] was founded by Badi’ al-Zaman
Nursi [d. 1960]. At first he cooperated with Kemal Atatürk but disillusioned
by his laicist policies he withdrew from active
politics and embarked on a programme of personal piety emphasising Islamic
identity and personal commitment, seen as a threat by the regime. Nursi’s major work, Risalat al-Nur, has become the key text for his followers throughout
the world. The Nurcu are open to the outside world
and missionary in their attitude. They seek to avoid political involvement and
conflict.
12. Milli Görüs.
This movement of the ‘national view’ combined an orthodox Islam with Turkish
nationalism. In the 1970s a close alliance grew up with the National Salvation
Party. After the military coup of 1980 the party was banned but it managed to
continue under various pseudonyms, often incorporating the terms ‘culture’ and
‘solidarity’. The civilian successor of the military government had been active
in the National Salvation Party. Since then Milli Görüs and the Diyanet work
closely together in the appointment of imams.
13. Alavi. The Alavis
of Turkey should not be confused with the Syrian community of the same name. It
is a movement with a low profile as it is mistrusted not only by the Turkish
state but also by Sunni orthodoxy. A substantial number of Alavis
are Kurds, a further reason for a tense relationship. The Alavis
have a strong reverence for Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad,
although they do not call themselves Shi’ites. The
movement replaces Sunni institutions, including often the mosque, by the rites
of the Bektashi Sufi tradition, called after the
medieval mystic Hajji Bektash. It has been suggested
that the Alavis represent the popular remnant of the
once powerful Bektashi order closely linked to the
Janissary regiments [the sultan’s bodyguard and elite troops].
Chapter 10 looks at “European Muslims in
a new Europe”?
Historically Europe has for
centuries been multicultural, the product of cultural and human intermarriage.
Britain had its Celtic, Norse, Saxon and Norman immigrations further enriched
by more recent Dutch, Huguenot, Jewish, Italian, Polish and Ukrainian
influences. But separating the past from the present has been the nation-state
of the 19th century and the creation of an ideological identity as
characteristic of the nation. This nationalism often involved a mythical
history of the nation.
Nevertheless, the national
culture could be identified with the dominant class in the nation which
controlled governmental and private institutions, the arts, the media,
political patronage, education and last but not least the national language.
The non-dominant sectors of society were truly subcultures.
The ethnic minorities of the
recent immigrations have taken the place of further subcultures underneath the
dominant national culture. But there is a difference with the existing
subcultures in that the newcomers do not share a common history of the last few
centuries. In fact, they look for cultural reference points outside the nation
state to countries that often experienced Europe as an adversary.
The new multicultural
situation is not intercultural. Cultural encounters do take place but the flow
of information and experience is mostly one-way. It is the minority groups who
have to adapt their attitudes, their language, their
way of life. The Dutch, Belgian or British are not going to integrate with the
minority.
Numbers play a role here but
also the bearers of the national culture who control the instruments of
political, economic and social control. It is power and a way of life which
make for a strong combination. As a consequence, the cultural and religious
traditions of the minority are tolerated so long as they do not impinge on the
life of the majority. They are treated as foreign bodies and therefore they are
foreign bodies.
“In one sense, what is
happening today in Europe is the fulfilment of one particular aspect of
imperialism, namely the subjugation of colonial peoples into the economic
necessities and cultural thought patters of the owners of the national cultures
of Europe and, more widely, the West.”
Characteristic was for long
the essentially secular analysis of the situation, ignoring the religious
dimension of the so-called immigrant or ethnic communities. There was an almost
evolutionary view that, as Muslims and other religious communities settled,
they would become, if not secularised, at least like most North European
Christians in confining their religious life to a small private niche. This
assumption lived as a fear also among the Muslims themselves, in particular
those of the first
generation. They were afraid that young people would drift away
from Islam. All this was shaken at the end of the 1980s by the Salman Rushdie affair (The Satanic Verses) in Britain and
the headscarves issue in France. They raised questions about the relations
between religion and the secular state (France) and about the role of religion,
both Christian and Islam, in public life (Church of England).
Changes are meanwhile taking
place within the Muslims communities, in two ways. First, they have come from
many different parts of the Muslim world and are mixing in European cities. It
becomes necessary to identify those aspects of the way of life which are
culturally relative and those representing Islamic core values. Secondly, the
young generation has gone through the European system of education. They
undertake, often consciously, a search of how Islam can be meaningful to them
in their European context, still beset by the continuing problem of racism and
xenophobia including as one significant component an anti-Islamic element.
The question, in the last
analysis, must be how far European society is also prepared to adapt. Models
may be suggested, but they cannot be imposed. Many of the ethnic minority
communities, including Muslims, traditionally place an emphasis on collective
identity and communal solidarity which may seem to contradict the modern
European cult, at least superficially, of the individual personality. So, modls of plurality may range from a collectivist ‘community
of communities’ to an individualist ideal of persona religious and cultural
freedom of movement.
In a plural society there must
be more room for differences than the traditional nation-state culture allows.
Justice can have several faces. It must be possible to open up the options for
different forms of family life, different kinds of business relations,
different educational priorities, different views on health, different
approaches to religious and social organisation.
However, differences of a religious kind have historically been more destructive than constructive. So differences have to find a place within an overall political, social and legal consensus. This would need a change of absolutes on all sides, a readiness to subject all our human absolutes to the goal of peaceful coexistence.